Security Risk Management Issues in Maritime trade: An Analysis by Barnes, Paul
2004 Academy of International Business (AIB) Southeast Asia Regional 
Conference 
  
 
Security Risk Management Issues in Maritime Trade: An Analysis. 
 
 
 
by 
 
Dr Paul Barnes, 
 
 
School of International Business 
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001 Australia 
Tel: +61 7 3964 9019; Fax: +61 7 3864 1771; 
E-mail: p.barnes@qut.edu.au
 1
Security Risk Management Issues in Maritime Trade: An Analysis. 
 
Abstract: 
 
Security is currently a key factor in the evolution of international trade, and maritime trade 
in particular, with a number of internationally mandated and voluntary initiatives 
underway focusing on vulnerabilities in supply and logistics chains. This paper suggests 
the combined effect of these initiatives, with suitable systems of risk management 
embedded in private and public sector groups within the industry may be more effective in 
mitigating the threat of maritime terrorism than with the initiatives alone.  The paper then 
draws on approaches to risk and crisis management in complex systems to examine 
options for integrating in-country and international frameworks.  
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Introduction: 
The events of September 11, 2001 precipitated a range of unilateral and multilateral 
responses to security threats internationally.  While an obvious initial focus of crisis 
management in the United States (U.S.) was shutting down domestic air space, attention 
moved quickly to security in maritime transport and specifically to maritime trade as 
vector for the delivery of terrorist acts to the U.S. mainland.  Particular emphasis was 
given to the global sea-container shipping system and vulnerabilities inherent within 
industry practice.   
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and other groups such as the World 
Customs Organisation (WCO) have jointly supported processes to enhance regulatory 
coverage of safety and security within the world trading system.  The IMO has promoted a 
number of security measures including changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
Convention addressing ship security with new requirements for an International Ship and 
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.  
 
Inter alia to these changes the U.S. has proposed a series of voluntary programmes aimed 
at enhancing security of trade into North American seaports. While not binding on trading 
partners, the measures are intended to provide levels of security assurance and facilitate 
enhanced movement of cargo by participating ports, carriers and companies.  These 
measures are intended to provide a competitive advantage to early voluntary adopters over 
time.   The two principal American voluntary programmes are the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). 
 
While the CSI and C-TPAT are sound strategies for addressing container security, there is 
recognition that these programs represent only a framework for building a maritime 
security regime, and that significant gaps in security coverage remain (Frittelli, 2003).  
Beyond the contention of ongoing gaps in security coverage there is, arguably, varied 
appreciation of the complexity of the international trading system itself, in particular the 
interface between port and host country.    
 
 This paper argues that the expected reliability and assurances of security in maritime trade 
will derive not merely from the adoption of mandated or voluntary security frameworks 
but as a result of implementing them by the organisations and businesses operating in, and 
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providing services to, ports and combining them with suitable systems of risk and crisis 
management.    
 
After detailing a number of recognised risk factors within the international maritime 
system the paper examines aspects of the current security initiatives.  Then drawing on 
findings from research into organisational responses to large-scale crises the paper 
discusses the need to ensure that maritime security regimes are appropriately embedded 
into the risk management systems used by organisations managing port-based 
infrastructure and interface with other international trade-related and security assurance 
systems operating with the port’s host country.   
 
Risk factors in Maritime Trade: 
Concern about shipping as a terrorist vector by the U.S. (with growing recognition in 
many other countries) is easily understood when noting that in 2001, approximately 5.400 
commercial ships (most not registered in the U.S. and crewed by non-US nationals) made 
near to 60,000 port visits (APEC, 2003a).   Additional context is added by the recognised 
complexity of port operations and the difficulty in effectively implementing security 
coverage over them (Hecker, 2002 and Harrald et. al. 2004).  
 
It has been estimated that up to 90% of world cargo movement occurs in shipping 
containers with up to 250 million movements each year.  It is further estimated that a mere 
2% of this volume is physically inspected post-arrival (Van de Voort  et. al., 2003; OECD, 
2003b). 
    
Concerns about security risk emerge from the interaction of a number of factors:   
• Cargo - using cargo to smuggle people and/or weapons (of a conventional, nuclear, 
chemical or biological nature). 
• Vessel - using the vessel as a weapon or means to launch an attack (including  
sinking a vessel to disrupt infrastructure) 
• People - attacking the ship to cause human casualties (or using the cover of 
seafarer identities to insert terrorist operatives). 
• Money - using revenue from shipping to fund terrorist activities or the launder 
money for terrorist organisations (OECD, 2003b). 
 
Evidence that concerns such as these are credible is offered in the widely reported incident 
of a stowaway in a shipping container detailed below: 
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In October 2001, authorities in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro 
discovered an unusually well-equipped and neatly dressed stowaway 
locked inside a shipping container. It was furnished as a makeshift home 
with a bed, water, supplies for a long journey and a bucket for a toilet. 
Italian police named the stowaway as Rizik Amid Farid, 43, and said he 
was born in Egypt but carried a Canadian passport. Unlike most 
stowaways, he was smartly dressed, clean-shaven and rested as he 
emerged.   
 
He was found to be carrying two mobile phones, a satellite phone, a laptop 
computer, several cameras, batteries and, ominously given recent events in 
the US, airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid 
for four major American airports.  He was carrying a return airline ticket 
from Montreal, Canada, to Egypt via Rome. Italian investigators said that 
the air ticket could be an “insurance policy” enabling him to reach Canada 
by air in case he was discovered in the container but managed to escape 
after being released from custody on bail.  OECD (2003 b)  
 
Whether such incidents are frequent may not be easy to confirm but the detail of the 
discovery does validate the existence of a viable threat.   
 
Fleet Ownership 
A further factor of concern is transparency in ship registration and ownership.  A recent 
study on the ownership and control of ships (OECD, 2003c) suggests that in addition to 
the absence of clarity on registration details, anonymity of ownership is a standard 
industry practice rather than the exception.  The use of ‘flags-convenience’ mechanisms 
are legally tolerated in almost all national jurisdictions and might enable terrorists or 
criminal elements to operate or influence the use of vessels behind a cloak of anonymity.  
 
False Documents  
Identity and qualification fraud is also a concern.  Sea faring jobs are relatively highly paid 
with the international benchmark for a deck hand in late 2003 of US$ 1,300 per month 
(Richards (2004a).  Richards (2004a) further reports that with demand outstripping supply 
and with regulation and recruitment and manning practices is lax, fraud and corruption is 
prevalent.    
 
Evidence has shown that a large number of qualification certificates held by seafarers are 
fraudulent and that fake papers for crew members can be bought and sold easily.  In 2001 
the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) reported on a survey of 97 maritime 
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administrations on the prevalence of certification fraud.  Of the 54 respondents, 82% had 
discovered this type fraud within its constituency.   
 
In a further example of this problem, the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF) bought a First Officer’s certificate for its General Secretary.  The certificate and 
seaman’s book (costing $US4,500), authorised him to navigate a vessel and deputise for 
its captain despite his complete lack of marine qualifications and skills. The ITF says that 
fake certificates have remained a problem as late as mid-2003 (Richards, 2004a).  
 
Piracy 
The sea is a domain that can barely be policed although there is a critical need to enforce 
relevant law and international treaties.  This especial  important given continued existence 
of modern and sophisticated strains of piracy  and its politicised cousin, the maritime form 
of the new stateless terrorism (Langewiesche, 2003).  Piracy is a well noted security issue 
internationally with known geographical areas of concern in the south East Asian region 
(Richardson, 2004a & 2004b; Anonymous, 2004; Jarvis, 2003; OECD, 2003b).  The IMO 
has reported a total of 45 instances of piracy (forced boarding, cargo hi-jacking and 
violent assault on crews) in their reporting category the ‘Far East,’ in the second quarter to 
June 2003 (Jarvis, 2003).  Over the ten year period 1993 to 2003 a total of 3,254 acts of 
piracy have been recorded in this geographical category.         
 
Ports as Critical Infrastructure 
In recent times ports have become pieces of critical infrastructure within the trading 
system.  Certain locations classify as “hub Ports” that due to their size and capacity have 
become essential to the global supply chain (Bateman, 2003).   Recent post September 11 
concerns about maritime commerce relate to the impact of a terrorist incident in such a 
location and the disruptive effect on seaborne trade.  Ships can usually re-route around a 
chokepoint, at cost in terms of time, but loss of a substantial facility is a major critical 
infrastructure protection issue.   A further element requiring protection at a port is the 
automated control systems used including, in particular, embedded information 
technology and information systems.  
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Insurance 
A sea-borne terrorist incident whether using conventional or improvised explosive devices 
or involving chemical, biological or nuclear materials would impact heavily on the 
availability and cost of marine insurance.  Premiums were tripled for ships calling at ports 
in Yemen after the 2002 terrorist attack on French oil tanker Limburg off the Yemeni 
coast.  This forced many vessels to cut Yemen from their schedules or divert to ports in 
neighbouring states.   In addition to increased insurance and re-insurance costs a 
catastrophic sea-borne terrorist attack would cause delays in shipping or in a best case, 
increase transit times for commodity movements.  Such disruptions of the supply chain 
would have repercussions around the world and profoundly affect business confidence 
(Richardson, 2004b)  
  
Current Maritime Security Measures 
The ongoing maintenance of trade and transport efficiency is an ideal outcome from any 
maritime security regime.  The new maritime security measures have emerged from two 
fora: mandated requirements from the IMO in the form of the ISPS Code.  Two voluntary 
initiatives are being promoted by the U.S in response to its own security analysis of the 
vulnerabilities of the maritime transport system - the CSI and the C-TPAT (OECD, 
2003b). Each of these initiatives is discussed below.  
 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code  
The requirements defined in the ISPS Code can be broadly broken down into a number of 
major categories according to their focus.   These are listed in Table 1 along with 
estimated establishment and yearly maintenance costs.   
Table 1: ISPS Code Requirements against Maritime Industry Sectors (OECD, 2003b). 
Governments       
• Determining which port facilities are required to designate a Port Facility 
Security Officer.  
• Ensuring completion and approval of a Port Facility Security Assessment and 
the Port Facility Security Plan for each port facility that serves ships engaged on 
international voyages.  
• Approving Ship Security Plans and amendments to previously approved plans.  
• Verifying compliance of ships and issuing the International Ship Security 
Certificate, and any subsequent amendments; and exercising control and 
compliance measures. − Communicating information to the International 
Maritime Organization and to the shipping and port industries 
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Table 1: Contd.  
Maritime carrier companies 
Initial Cost (million USD)      $1170.6                         Yearly Costs (million USD)      $725.6                    
Companies will: 
• Designate a Company Security Officer (CSO).  
• Undertake a Ship Security Assessment (SSA), including an on-site visit, for 
every vessel to be issued a SSC.  
• Develop a Flag-State-approved Ship Security Plan (SSP) that references the 
individual ship’s SSA and incorporates all of the elements included in part “A” 
of the ISPS Code.  
• Designate a Ship Security Officer (SSO).  
• Provide adequate training for the CSO, SSO and crew and ensuring that 
adequate drills and exercises are carried out.  
• Ensure that vessels are equipped to carry out the security procedures outlined in 
their SSP’s.  
• Ensure adequate security-related record-keeping.  
 
 
Table 1: Contd.  
Ships  (requirements)   
Initial Cost (million USD)      $757.4                 Yearly Costs (million USD)      $4.3                 
Automatic 
Identification 
System 
Ship-borne communication devices detailing to other AIS 
transponders and shore-based facilities information on the ship’s 
identity, position, heading and speed (Primarily designed to 
enhance the safety of navigation in crowded areas). 
Identification 
number 
Vessels must have a unique identification number. This number 
must be displayed by July 1, 2004.  
Security 
alert system 
 
All passenger ships, high-speed cargo vessels, chemical tankers, oil 
tankers and gas carriers of more than 500 gross tons must be fitted 
with a Ship Security Alert System that will:  
• Initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a 
competent authority designated by the Flag administration, 
which in these circumstances may include the company, 
identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security 
of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised.  
• Not send the ship security alert to any other ships.  
• Not raise any alarm on-board the ship.  
• Continue the ship security alert until deactivated and/or reset.  
• Be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and 
in at least one other location.  
• Conform to performance standards not inferior to those 
adopted by the IMO. 
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Table 1: Contd.  
Ports 
Initial Cost (million USD)     $55.8                 Yearly Costs (million USD)    $1.6                    
Port  facilities that receive vessels engaged in international trade will be required to: 
• Carry out, and have approved, port facility security assessments.  
• Develop port facility security plans that detail measures to be taken at each 
security alert level, and address single-ship security alerts.  
• Designate a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) with skills and training 
roughly similar to the CSO.  
• Ensure that the PFSO and other appropriate personnel receive adequate training 
to carry out their duties and that security drills are held to ensure the readiness.  
• Ensure that port facilities are sufficiently equipped and staffed in order to 
operate under relevant security levels 
• Certification/documentary requirements. 
 
The detailed requirements of the ISPS code address a number of the risk factors listed 
earlier.  Ship identification, security planning and alert systems have been mandated as 
well as detailed requirements for maritime carriers.  On obvious emphasis is on ship 
owners and ensuring that ships have the capacity to report alerts while underway.  The 
initial outlay for the ISPS is estimated to cost $1,983.8 million USD with an annual 
maintenance cost of $731 million. 
 
Container Security Initiative (CSI)  
The CSI seeks to develop bi-lateral agreements between the United States and foreign 
countries to pre-screen high-risk containers in ports of loading. While the majority of 
containers do not pose any security threat all identified high-risk containers will be 
inspected, either before loading at a CSI port or, if arriving from another port, upon arrival 
in the United States.  In CSI ports, local customs officials and U.S. Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection staff would jointly decide on which containers to inspect before 
loading.  The initiative is built around 4 principal elements shown Table 2 below. 
Table 2:  Elements of the CSI (OECD, 2003b). 
• Establish security criteria to identify high-risk containers.  
• Pre-screen those containers prior to American arrival  
      (Involves the deployment of American Customs officials to foreign ports).  
• Use technological means to pre-screen these containers.  
• Develop and use IT-enabled and secure containers. 
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The C-TPAT is the second major voluntary security initiative promoted by the U.S.  The 
C-TPAT aims to ensure that participants implement policies, plans and procedures to 
ensure the integrity of their entire supply chain.  Participants will be expected to sign 
agreements committing to the following four actions listed in Table 3.  
Table 3:  Requirements for C-TPAT (OECD, 2003b). 
Participants are expected to: 
• Conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using the C-
TPAT security guidelines jointly developed by U.S. Customs and the trade 
community. The guidelines encompass: Procedural Security, Physical Security, 
Personnel Security, Education and Training, Access Controls, Manifest 
Procedures, and Conveyance Security (Participants must also submit a supply 
chain security profile questionnaire to U.S. Customs).  
• Develop and implement a program to enhance security throughout the supply 
chain in accordance with C-TPAT guidelines.  
• Communicate C-TPAT guidelines to other companies in the supply chain and 
work toward building the guidelines into relationships with these companies.  
 
In return for agreement to and implementation of these additional initiative and the 
validation of the participant’s plans, it has been suggested that C-TPAT participants are 
less likely to be targeted for customs inspections and would benefit from expedited 
customs procedures in the medium short to medium term.  
 
The scope of all three maritime security initiatives is shown in Figure 1.   The ISPS code 
focuses on maritime carriers and ships with particular legislative roles for national 
governments.  The CSI seeks to expedite the identification of higher risk containers and 
pre-screen them before allowing on-forwarding to intended destinations. 
       
  
Figure 1: Scope of IMO and US Maritime Security Initiatives  
(OECD 2003c) 
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C-TPAT framework attempts to overlay an extensive screening and assessment regime 
across supply chains to include both infrastructure and functionaries in a country-of-origin 
and those in the country-of-destination.        
The costs of complying with both the CSI and C-TPAT initiatives is undetermined and 
would vary depending on pre-existing risk management systems in place at major ports.  
Beyond issues of costs it is likely that full implementation of the C-TPAT system, because 
of its intrusive scope, would require detailed negotiations among companies and 
authorities engaged in international trade in all trading countries. 
The potential costs to participants are great as they must invest in securing the physical 
integrity of their own premises and that of their trading partners as well. Other costs 
include training staff, adding security guards, developing security risk management plans 
and processing C-TPAT paperwork.  It is likely that involvement in the C-TPAT initiative 
will require substantial investment for many industry sectors however many already have 
effective security practices in place to reduce the theft. The latter will likely face lower 
participation costs (OECD, 2003b). 
 
Regional Diplomacy 
Acceptance of the intrusiveness of the C-TPAT initiative is likely to require considerable 
negotiation with many countries.  Within our local area an ongoing process of national 
consultation and cooperation on preventing terrorism, including maritime piracy is being 
promoted under auspices of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (APEC, 2003a).   . 
 
The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative for example seeks to strengthen 
maritime security against terrorism while boosting trade efficiency. In addition to 
supporting the implementation of the ISPS Code, this initiative encourages 
implementation of common standards for electronic customs reporting (a World Customs 
Organisation program), support baggage screening procedures and mandatory aviation 
security audits (required by the International Civil Aviation Organisation), and for 
implementation of a common standard for the collection and transmission of advanced 
passenger information to prevent the fraudulent use of travel documents by terrorists 
APEC (2003a). 
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The STAR Initiative seeks to generate new partnerships between government and business 
at the national and international level resulting in mitigation of terrorist or criminal threats 
throughout the supply and logistics chain.  
 
Members of ASEAN are encouraging a shift in the focus of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) from traditional attention to inter-state power relations towards commonly 
perceived threats such as international terrorism, piracy at sea, arms smuggling and other 
trans-national crimes.  Greater cooperation has been pledged by ARF members on these 
areas of concern, in particular, threats to maritime security (Severin, 2003).  Dialogue on 
these broader issues including trans-national crime is also to be progressed through the 
activities of the Council for Security Cooperation ion Asia Pacific (CSCAP, 2003).   
 
This expanding dialogue is needed urgently if ASEAN is serious in achieving a European 
Union-like economic community by the year 2020, as recently reported (Hew, 2003).  The 
resurgence of border and trade security as an issue in Europe, recently, has firmly 
established regional cooperation on a range of security issues as a critical factor (European 
Commission, 2004).  While the interactive complexity among 25 land-locked European 
nations is obviously great the requirements of trade across land and maritime borders, as 
in South-East Asia, seem more challenging by orders of magnitude.         
 
Managing Risk in Complex Systems 
The maritime supply chain is susceptible to the effects of terrorism and other varieties of 
perturbation because of its global and open nature, and its complexity (Van de Voort, M., 
et. al., 2003).  Further, the complex organisation and unique vulnerabilities of ports and 
associated support components are not easily appreciated or understood (Harrald, 
Stephens & van Dorp, 2004).  The U.S. Government Accounting Office has suggested 
also that difficulties in coordination among public and private entities with an interest in 
port security, generally, may make effective security programs hard to establish (Hecker, 
2002).       
 
A security incident (or a multiple concurrence of incidents) could occur at any time along 
a supply chain network.  By design and function the current maritime trade initiatives 
discussed in this paper (other than ship-specific practices) are more suited to reducing the 
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likelihood of incidents rather than to respond to or resolve them.  The capacity to respond 
to incidents, whether at a port or at sea, will be dependent on the security infrastructure 
and emergency systems in-place locally and maritime resources available.  The 
effectiveness of the C-TPAT initiative, in particular, will also be dependent on local 
systems and the interactive efficiencies of these systems.            
 
Accidents in large highly complex systems can occur in a number of ways. They may 
emerge suddenly due to the interaction of previously separated system elements or may 
cook slowly (without recognition) until they appear.  In either case the accidents 
(incidents) are often surprising and unexpected.  There is a well established literature on 
complex systems failures where, on investigation, evidence was discovered that there had 
been ‘signs’ that disaster was emerging from organisational ‘noise’ (Perrow, 1984; Turner 
& Pidgeon 1997; Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Comfort et. al., 2001, Rijpma, 1997).   
 
Organisations that fail to note the presence of ‘warning signs’ during the so-called 
‘incubation’ of these failures have been termed ‘crisis prone’ (Mitroff et. al., 1989; 
Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003).  Crisis prone organisations may be 
more at-risk because of in-attentiveness to internal processes as well as the wider 
environment that they operate within.   
 
Dysfunctional internal control and coordination mechanisms within a broader risk 
management/corporate governance framework may have resulted in a reduced capacity to 
detect warning signs or understand their meaning.  Inflexible cultural factors or belief 
systems within an organisation itself might also contribute to this reduced awareness.   
Notions of in-vulnerability or indifference to external or internal threats (Boin & Lagadec, 
2000) are examples of organisation-level issues.   
 
Equally there are situations where, as a result of extreme systems complexity, warning 
signs might have been visible, or if detectable, not understood.  While not the same 
category as the situation above, where a crisis signalling its arrival could have been 
detected, this second category could be the result of totally new systems behaviour or an 
incomplete understanding or appreciation of the system in question.  The international 
maritime trading system, as a ‘system of systems,’ is a likely example of this.  
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Realistically a systems complexity continuum exists involving the port system and the 
wider trading system.  Port management (and by default governments) have to deal with 
two forms of vulnerability within this continuum: Internal (a port-based system with sub-
components, and related management structures); and External (the international trade 
system).     
 
Although individual port elements (as stand alone sub-systems) may be tightly connected, 
the functional links to other systems within a port can be relatively loose.  A container 
facility is for example, ‘tightly coupled’ with the inter-modal rail yard and the scheduled 
arrival of container vessels, but only loosely connected with the adjacent petroleum 
facility or cruise terminal.  Similarly, cargo and passengers are transferred to and from the 
maritime mode connecting them with other transportation modes (e.g. rail, road, or 
pipeline) (Harrald, Stephens and van Dorp, 2004).   
 
As noted above, processes at ports and in related systems, can be difficult to coordinate.  
The lack of awareness of a security incident in one sub-component may severely impact 
another.  Other than provisions against criminal theft and violence, security may not have 
been a design criterion for any of these maritime sub-systems.  This absence of in-built 
security in the segregated sub-systems may mean retro-fitting security at international 
ports will be more than just enhanced asset protection.  A port security framework, 
logically, would need to extend well ashore within both the U.S. and international settings 
(e.g. security for container and other general trade movements) as well as at sea (passenger 
vessel).  Currently, vulnerabilities inherent in such complex systems (ports) are not 
adequately understood (Harrald, Stephens and van Dorp, 2004).     
 
The importance of ensuring that international ports and in-country essential services are 
fully integrated with on-site security systems is critical.  Similarly, the CSI and C-TPAT 
initiatives will need a similar integration to maximise effectiveness.  A third requirement 
is that organisations at a port must be crisis prepared and not crisis prone.  Given the well 
established causal and contributory factors from the management of organisations during 
crises, this third requirement may be the most critical factor in a successful security 
regime for world trade.             
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Discussion  
The C-TPAT and CSI frameworks are designed to focus on specific factors of supply 
chains and connect port operators to other port operators.   As guidelines they are gently 
coercive to individual firms or providers of services within ports and indirectly, regional 
governments. While focused on key components of the supply chain they may also require 
attention to functions and activities that are additional to a firm’s normal management 
practices and operational capabilities. 
 
This paper argues that security initiatives alone will not provide assurance that the trading 
system is protected adequately and that an effective level of involvement by national port 
authorities, operators and regional governments is also required.  In addition, there are a 
range capabilities and capacities both implicit and explicit in the ISP, CSI and the C-
PTAT initiatives that may have to be developed within resident organisations.   
 
One of these organisational level capabilities is Crisis Management.  As mentioned earlier 
both ‘slow’ and ‘rapid’ onset crises emerge readily in highly complex systems.  The 
degree of fore-warning is dependent often on the sophistication of existing organisational 
monitoring systems available.  It is recognised that organisational performance declines 
during crises where conditions of increasing complexity, multiple levels of activity and 
increased flows of information impact adversely on human decision makers (Comfort et. 
al. 2001).  
 
As mentioned earlier the presence of both internal and external vulnerability within 
systems increase the vigilance needed within organisations.  Crises create situations that 
cannot be anticipated so ‘warning sign’ detection is critical as is a tested ability to respond 
to emergencies quickly and effectively (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). 
 
A robust crisis management capability and capacity includes capabilities for:  
• Environmental Scanning (Detection of weak signals)   
• Emergency Management Escalation Triggers (incident or issue recognition) 
leading to rapid consequence analyses (in the context of high uncertainty)  
• Crisis Management Decision-making Capacity (separate to routine business 
decision making structures) 
• Clearly stated, understood and tested communication mechanisms for reporting 
emergent incident/issues to the port CEO and senior management of associated 
infrastructure and service providers (Barnes, 2001). 
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These crisis management capabilities match many of the known organisational factors that 
contribute to complex systems failures.  The widespread prevalence of these capacities 
would enhance implementation of the ISPS, CSI and C-TPAT initiatives by providing the 
means for compliance with the guidelines.  Confidence across regional boundaries that 
trading partners have similar and supportive detection and response capabilities would add 
to assurance on security.             
 
Conclusion 
Collectively the three security initiatives discussed here can provide dual-benefits to port 
operators and onsite businesses that extend beyond just reducing the likelihood of terrorist 
acts perpetrated through the maritime trading system.   
 
An effective security regime within maritime trade, however, will require more than just 
the implementation of these systems but the recognition and response to organisational 
complexity at two levels: (1) at Ports and port-related infrastructure and (2) within the 
interconnected ‘system of systems’ that is the world maritime trading network.    
 
Achievement of a measure of influence over both internal and external vulnerability will 
require an enhanced awareness of how to design and operate management systems that are 
both flexible and self-regulatory, exhibiting attention to detail and able to accommodate 
uncertainty and the unexpected. 
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